Linklater (1998): "Unlike neo-realism, critical approaches [like mine] take the prospects for ethical foreign policy and the possibility of new forms of political community seriously. ... [So they focus on] new images of international relations [that are] concerned ... with the problem of exclusionary political communities and their role in generating conflict and war" (p. 16). ... "In British international relations theory, though not in the United States, the intellectual initiative now lies with the project of reform" (p. 19).
Rodin (2003): "National-defense cannot be reduced to a collective application of personal rights of self-defense, and it cannot be explained as a state-held right analogous to personal self-defense" (p. 162).  . . . . [So] we need a framework of international ethics which gives greater recognition and protection to the rights of individuals as against states, which can address the problems of civil war and internal oppression, and which is able to more effectively restrain international aggression" (p. 199)
Glover (2001): "Philosophers will not be impressed by the weak and confused quality of [Robert] Oppen-heimer's thinking about making the [atomic] bomb.  It is clear that scientists, including Oppenheimer, had no idea of the existence of a kind of thinking which they lacked.  Their ignorance is only part of the general failure of philosophy, at least at that time, to make a serious impact on the thinking of the wider community.  By omission, philosophers who only talk to each other bear some responsibility for a climate conducive to the evasive thought which contributed to Hiroshima" (p. 103).
Brandes (1997): "The permanent existence of an immense, profit-seeking national defense industry implied an end to American exceptionalism.  The American nation had long been spared the existence of a large standing army served by a colony of purveyors, but now those days were a thing of the past. . . . Besides eroding American exceptionalism, large, ongoing defense expenditures would raise difficult new questions that would persist throughout the ethical twilight that was the cold war. . . . Four decades of the cold war created new issues that redefined and veiled the meaning of profiteering once again. . . . The cold war blurred the difference between wartime and peacetime, and the rise of what some have called the National Security State obscured the difference between war profits and civilian profits." (pp. 274-275).
Klare (2002): "While diplomacy and economic sanctions can be effective in promoting other economic goals, only military power can ensure the continued flow of oil and other critical materials from (or through) distant areas in times of war and crisis.  As their unique contribution to the nation's economic security. therefore, the armed forces have systematically bolstered their capacity to protect the international flow of essential materials." (p. 9.)
Hedges (2003): "The state and the institutions of state become, for many, the center of worship in wartime. . . . The moral certitude of the state in wartime is a kind of fundamentalism.  And this dangerous messianic brand of religion, one where self-doubt is minimal, has come increasingly to color the modern world of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. . . . There is a danger of growing fusion between those in the state who wage war--both for and against modern states--and those who believe they understand and can act as agents for God." (pp. 146-147)
Rich (2006): "Why so many smart people wanted to lash their reputations to [President Bush's] Iraq adventure given all that was known beforehand is as much a case study in psychology as in history,  They didn't see what they didn't want to see until it was too late.  Sometimes they seemed tone-deaf to the cultural manipulations of the Bush product-rollout apparatus, with its very deliberate and scripted orchestration of cues, especially its ostentatious repetition of nuclear imagery, between Labor Day 2002 and the invasion the following March.  Shouldn't it have raised alarms that a war was being rushed on an arbitrary and reckless timetable that was in sync with an American election campaign?" (p. 222.)
Turse (2008): “The classic iron triangle–Congress, big military contractors . . . and the Pentagon–has always formed the essential core of the military-industrial complex.  These firms still reign supreme as the primary weapons-producing ‘merchants of death,’ but huge arms dealers . . . are now only a portion of the story.  While they may still rake in the largest single sums of any Pentagon contractors, their total take . . . is dwarfed by the combined totals of the rest of the DoD’s contractors.  These include big-name companies, small firms, and organizations you might never suspect of being on the military dole . . .  These entities . . . [are] turning the iron triangle into . . . ten-thousand-sided polygons.” (p. 31.)
Milgram (1974): “The essence of obedience consists in the fact that a person comes to view himself as the instrument for carrying out another person’s wishes, and he therefore no longer regards himself as responsible for his actions.  Once this critical shift of viewpoint has occurred in the person, . . . (t)he adjustment of thought, the freedom to engage in cruel behavior, and the types of justification experienced by the person are essentially similar whether they occur in a psychological laboratory or the control room of an ICBM site.” (p. xviii.)
Rubenstein (2010): "(W)e are defending a forward position because our previous position came under attack; we were defending that position because a prior position was threatened; and so forth.  This logic, which produces a continuous expansion of U.S. military commitments abroad, effectively erases the distinction between self-defense and aggression.  It also erases the distinction between America conceived of as a nation and as an empire." (p. 53).
Norman (1995): "[To move beyond] a world in which people can sometimes see no alternative but to resort to war, we . . . . start from a situation where military defence is the recognised form of defence, where military institutions are firmly entrenched in a dominant position within our societies and where huge amounts of resources are devoted to preparations for war.  There is no way in which these institutions can be simply wished away, but also no way in which they can be reconciled with the moral case against war." (pp. 236, 237)
Hartung (2011): "Ultimately, it was not words or arguments or an abstract fear of communism that opened the military spigot, but war--the Korean War . . . The new conflict offered Lockheed President Gross a chance to wax more patriotic than he had in making the case for post-World War II subsidies. . . . But it wasn't just about Korea, Gross pointed out.  The question was, 'Are we committed to deal with all future armed aggressions against the peace of the world?'  If so, we needed the means to provide transport of 'men, food, ammunition, ...'" (p. 59)